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Abstract
This article analyses the connection between emigration policies and nationalism
in interwar Yugoslavia (1918–1941). It argues that Yugoslav policymakers used emigra-
tion as a means of nation-building. On the one hand, the Yugoslav state pursued long-
distance nation-building by aiming to create a ‘Yugoslav diaspora’ out of the hundreds of
thousands of overseas emigrants of South Slavic extraction who had left territories that
in 1918 became part of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the state pursued an ethnically
differentiated exit policy. To this end, the emigration of minorities was supported,
particularly in the case of non-Slavic Muslims, while the emigration of so-called ‘national’
elements was restricted. In order to assess the efficacy of these policies, the article also
looks at the legal and institutional framework within which migration policies were
carried out. It concludes that, while the policies’ effects did not correspond with pol-
icymakers’ intentions, emigration policy nevertheless provides an original perspective
on nation-building in interwar Yugoslavia.
Keywords
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Introduction
On 4 March 1929 the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’ (SHS) ambas-
sador to Argentina sent a query to the Kingdom’s Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs.
His message concerned the repatriation of immigrants who held SHS
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citizenship but were of Magyar or German ethnicity and had requested return
permits:
Since these people had left our Kingdom dissatisﬁed with the new conditions,
and because they represent an alien ethnic element which is of no use to our national
state – on the contrary, according to the embassy’s opinion it should be in our interest
that there are as few of these people as possible, especially in the border areas – the
embassy kindly requests instructions from the Ministry as to whether the return of
these people is opportune.1
On 10 August 1929, the Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs sent its reply:
The Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs has the honour of informing the Royal Embassy that
requests for repatriation to the Kingdom by our citizens of Magyar and German
nationality should be dismissed under whatever pretext. The return of these a-national
elements to our country must be obstructed to the furthest extent possible.2
This exchange illustrates the close connection between emigration policies and
nation-building in interwar Yugoslavia.3 This article analyses the conceptual links
between emigration and nation-building that were made by Yugoslav policy-
makers, and the political measures they took in order to render emigration
useful for the nation. I argue that emigration policies were part of the intense,
controversial and multi-dimensional eﬀorts to integrate the ‘Yugoslav’ nation
after the creation of a Yugoslav state in 1918.
The national rationale of emigration policies is particularly evident in the con-
trast between oﬃcial attitudes towards members of the titular South Slavic nation
on the one hand, and members of the non-Slavic minority groups on the other.
From a more general perspective, emigration policies were connected to the polit-
ical elite’s interest in territorializing the national body in a new state. Both emi-
gration and the existence of minorities in the country were seen by policymakers as
Habsburg and Ottoman legacies, which the new national state had to deal with. At
the same time, the government imagined the nation in a trans-territorial way.
Emigrants who were considered to be of ‘Yugoslav’ extraction were to be turned
into a Yugoslav diaspora by policies of long-distance nation-building; they were
conceived as dislocated members of the nation. Yugoslavia’s interwar emigration
policies, therefore, show that diaspora as a category of practice can be the intended
product of transnational policies put in place by a nation-building state. In the case
of interwar Yugoslavia, in other words, it was not so much an e´migre´ population
that imagined itself a ‘homeland’, but a homeland that imagined itself a ‘diaspora’.
States, Nations, Emigration
Yugoslavia’s eﬀorts to regulate emigration in a way that would ‘strengthen’ the
nation were by no means idiosyncratic. Recent literature on emigration policy
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stresses the idea that concepts of the nation are revealed not only in the treatment
of immigrants, but also in the way that departing citizens are treated. Nancy Green
and Franc¸ois Weil accentuate this connection by arguing that ‘Deﬁning emigrants
was . . . part of a larger process of deﬁning citizens (and their obligations), national
character, as well as the notion of a cultural nation’.4
Nation states aim to establish sovereign power over a clearly demarcated territory
and its population. Their legitimacy comes from the notion that all citizens hold
equal membership in a collective called the nation. Emigration, therefore, seems to
undermine these premises of the nation state, by allowing citizens to exit the state’s
territory and to give up their membership in the national collective. There are two
principal reasons that emigration is so signiﬁcant to national states in this regard.
First of all, as Charles Tilly has remarked, the modern state prefers sedentary sub-
jects who canmore easily be counted, taxed, drafted into the army, sent to school and
otherwise controlled.5 Hence, maintaining control over population movements,
especially movements across state borders, is a central element of modern statehood.
Second, nationalists usually view the ‘nation’ as a coherent body. To them, both
entries into the nation as well as exits from it are potentially hazardous. Immigrants
are often portrayed as a threat to the ‘purity’ of the nation, while emigration is
considered a threat to its strength. Historically, nationalist concerns about emigra-
tion have been particularly intense in those regions where mass emigration paralleled
nation-building. Germany, Italy and Poland, which all experienced massive emigra-
tion to the Americas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are cases in
point. Donna Gabaccia, Dirk Hoerder and Adam Walaszek stress that:
After the 1890s, nationalists in all three places dreamed that emigration would spread
their cultures to less developed areas of the world, increasing their international
inﬂuence. With World War I . . . and new world countries imposing sharp limits on
immigration, the national states of Poland, Germany and Italy all sought to bind
their citizens abroad – whether imagined as Polonia, italiani nel mondo, or
Auslandsdeutsche – more closely to their national homelands.6
The nationalist conceptualization of emigration, thus, reveals a paradox of
nationalism. On the one hand, nationalists strive to organize political sovereignty
over a certain territory in the name of the nation in order to territorialize the
nation. On the other hand, they may come to view the nation in a de-territorialized
manner if membership in the nation is not deﬁned only in political terms (as mem-
bership in the polis). In the latter case, the establishment of a state is often followed
by policies that aim at extending sovereignty and symbolic control over all mem-
bers of the nation who live outside the national state. The ideological basis of such
politics is an ethnicized vision of the nation, as pointed out by Franceso Raggazzi:
The deterritorialized conception of the management of a population arose from a fear
of losing the national body and entailed a practice whereby the link with the ‘centre’
was not determined by territoriality, but by something else: kinship, ethnicity . . .7
604 European History Quarterly 42(4)
 at Universitatsbibliothek on August 23, 2016ehq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
The experience of emigration, therefore, fostered an ethnic understanding of the
nation in the age of globalization.8 Geo-political realities in Southeastern Europe
furthered this understanding. The region’s nineteenth-century nationalists tended
to stress descent and common culture as the deﬁning characteristics of the nation.
The fact that borders crossed through these imagined ‘nations’ following the estab-
lishment of nation states also made de-territorialized images of the nation wide-
spread. The understanding of the nation that arose in this complicated context
included people living outside the nation state – regardless of whether they were
just across the border or across the Atlantic – even as it excluded all those of ‘alien’
descent who lived within the state’s territorial boundaries. Thus, it is hardly sur-
prising that nationalists often considered the emigration of minorities a means of
‘cleansing’ the nation of elements that it could not digest, that is, assimilate. The
history of nation-building in Southeastern Europe since the nineteenth century is,
in other words, also a history of forced emigration.9
The ‘First’ Yugoslavia as a National State
The connection between nation-building and emigration policies in interwar
Yugoslavia is quite evident. Aleksandar Miletic´, in his discussion of the
Kingdom of SHS’s emigration regime, contends that the Kingdom aimed at pre-
venting the departure of ‘national’ elements, i.e. members of the imagined South
Slavic nation, at the same time as it encouraged the emigration of non-Slavs.10
Non-Slavic Muslims (i.e., Albanians and Turks) faced the greatest pressure to
emigrate, as has been highlighted by Edvin Pezo.11 Pezo’s research reveals that
during the 1930s, the views of the Serb-dominated Belgrade political elite as well as
those of local bureaucrats in so-called Southern Serbia (today’s Kosovo and
Macedonia) became more radical. It was at this time that extremists ﬁrst argued
for the deportation of Yugoslavia’s Albanian and Turkish minorities. The ‘ﬁrst’
Yugoslav state also planned to utilize domestic migration for nation-building and
to ‘Slavicize’ both the Vojvodina region in the north of the country and ‘Southern
Serbia’. Each of these regions hosted large minorities (Magyars and Germans in the
north, Albanians and Turks in the south) which were seen as disloyal and alien.12
These migration policies were framed by the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia’s
complex nation-building project. Two major challenges shaped this eﬀort. First,
the Kingdom had to establish a viable state machinery in an area that until 1918
had been divided between seven territorial-political units. Second, the state had to
create the nation whose political manifestation it was supposed to be. Both were
demanding tasks. When the uniﬁcation of the Yugoslav lands into the new
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Kingdom of SHS) was proclaimed on 1
December 1918, the new polity resembled a jigsaw of territories with very diﬀerent
historical experiences and a high degree of linguistic, religious and ethnic hetero-
geneity. A brief survey of these territories reveals their remarkable diversity. Serbia
and Montenegro had been independent kingdoms before 1918, both including
areas occupied during the recent Balkan Wars of 1912/13. The remaining territories
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that came to comprise the new Kingdom of SHS had all been attached to Austria-
Hungary. Slovenia13 and Dalmatia had been part of the Austrian ‘half’
(Cisleithania) of the Dual Monarchy. Croatia and Slavonia as well as the
Vojvodina had all been associated with the Hungarian realm (Transleithania).
While Croatia and Slavonia had been an autonomous kingdom within Hungary,
the Vojvodina had been an integral part of Hungary. Finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina
had held a special status within Austria-Hungary since its occupation in 1878 and
annexation in 1908. The integration of these territories with their diﬀerent legal
systems and unique institutions was made even more diﬃcult by the ethnic hetero-
geneity of the new state (Appendix, Table 1).
Given this remarkable internal heterogeneity and the daunting external chal-
lenges that Yugoslavia faced, the dominant political elite of the Kingdom felt an
urgent need to integrate the country’s population and its administration into a
uniﬁed national state. They argued that, ‘Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were but
three ‘‘tribes’’ of a single, ‘‘tri-named’’ nation’.14 This idea of ‘Yugoslavism’
(‘South-Slavism’) had provided the founding ideology of the Kingdom of SHS,
and consecutive governments of this new state wanted to make it a lived reality.15
Many bureaucrats and intellectuals believed in the existence of a Yugoslav nation
and this concept informed the policies that they proposed. These elites considered
the Yugoslav state to be the political manifestation of the South Slavs’ historic
aspirations to unity and independence. Non-Slavic minorities were tolerated if only
because tolerance was prescribed by the post-World War One peace treaties, but
they certainly were not welcome. Attitudes towards the four major minorities –
Germans, Magyars, Albanians and Turks – were further hardened by the fact that
Yugoslav nationalists associated these groups with the oppression experienced by
Slavs in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.
‘Yugoslavism’, though, could mean very diﬀerent things in politics. There is no
space here for a recapitulation of the turmoil that characterized the political devel-
opment of interwar Yugoslavia, but some of the dilemmas facing the young state
must be mentioned because they aﬀected emigration policies.16 The most salient
political conﬂict was that between those who argued for a centralized state, and
those who championed a federal order. The two main political forces contending
over this issue were Belgrade-based parties on the one hand and the Croatian
peasant party on the other. On 28 June 1921, parliament narrowly passed the
new constitution, which envisioned a centralized state – an idea that was opposed
by most Croatian politicians. Centralization and the concurrent propaganda of
integral Yugoslavism got another major boost when, in the midst of political
crisis, King Aleksandar I suspended the constitution and established a royal dic-
tatorship on 6 January 1929. Aleksandar divided the country into a new set of
administrative districts, which did away with the state’s historical provinces. In
addition, he changed the state’s name to the ‘Kingdom of Yugoslavia’. Both of
these measures were clearly aimed at creating and enforcing a common Yugoslav
national identity. After the assassination of the King in a plot by Croatian and
Macedonian nationalists in Marseille on 9 October 1934, these policies of
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‘Yugoslavism’ were continued by the government of Prime Minister Milan
Stojadinovic´.
In general, these policies failed to eradicate Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian
national identiﬁcations. The Belgrade government’s repressive policies, which fur-
thered centralization under Serb leadership, reduced the appeal of a Yugoslav
national identity for non-Serbs. Many a Serb politician or intellectual extolled
the virtues of a Yugoslav identity while earnestly believing that Serbs were the
new nation’s most valuable element.17 Eventually, the Belgrade government
acknowledged that its insistence on a unitary, centralized order undermined the
viability of the state and it reached a compromise with Croatian leaders. In August
1939 the two sides agreed to establish an autonomous Croatian Banovina. The
Banovina was to encompass most of the Croat populated areas of the country
and to have its own governor and legislative assembly with jurisdiction in most
policy areas. The new arrangement was not even fully implemented when Germany
launched its attack on Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, and promptly destroyed the
state.
Institutionalizing Emigration Control
There were a number of reasons that Yugoslav policymakers were quick to turn
their attention to emigration. First of all, they were impressed by the sheer number
of what they considered ‘Yugoslav’ emigrants. Large areas that in 1918 became
part of the Kingdom of SHS had experienced signiﬁcant overseas emigration
before World War One. The Slovenian lands, Croatia and Slavonia, Dalmatia,
Montenegro and Macedonia were deeply aﬀected by emigration at this time.
According to US statistics, some 620,000 South Slavs immigrated to the United
States of America between 1899 and 1920.18 In 1923, the Yugoslav Section of the
US Foreign Information Service noted that of the 635,000 Yugoslavs currently in
the United States, 350,000 were of Croat origin, 195,000 were Slovenes and 90,000
were Serbs. Most of them lived in Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ohio.19 In 1925 the
leading Yugoslav migration expert, Artur Benko Grado estimated that some
743,300 Yugoslavs (6 per cent of the country’s population) lived outside of
Europe. Of these, 600,000 lived in the United States. The second largest
Yugoslav ‘colonies’ were located in Argentina and Canada, with some 30,000
each.20
Another impulse for attention to migration policies in the years after World War
One was the high number of repatriates returning from overseas. Artur Benko
Grado has estimated their number at 26,300 between the years of 1918 and
1920.21 According to him, these returnees often fell victim to swindlers who over-
charged them for the voyage home or parted them from their savings in other ways.
Thus, the need for state protection of repatriates arose. Migration experts also saw
repatriates from the USA as a potential political threat because many of them were
said to lean towards republicanism or even Bolshevism. Thus, political control of
returnees was also considered necessary.22
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External factors played a role in the establishment of emigration controls as
well. The restrictions on immigration imposed by many popular overseas destin-
ation countries forced countries of emigration, such as the Kingdom of SHS, to
enforce exit quotas in order to avoid paying costs stemming from the repatriation
of emigrants who had been denied entry. The most important immigration restric-
tions were those set by the United States. The Emergency Quota Act (also known
as the Johnson Quota Act) of 1921 limited the annual number of immigrants from
the Kingdom of SHS to 6,426 immigrants. US diplomats urged Yugoslav autho-
rities to cooperate in enforcing the quota.23 The Kingdom’s new emigration service,
therefore, was forced to regulate the issuing of passports for emigration to the
United States in order to ensure that the quota was not exceeded. This proved
to be diﬃcult because many more Yugoslavs wanted to leave for the United States
than would be admitted. During the 1921/2 ﬁscal year, for instance, the Yugoslav
quota to the US was already exhausted on 1 December 1921.24 Things became even
more diﬃcult when the US Congress passed the Johnson-Reed Act (also known as
the Immigration Act) in 1924, which set the Kingdom of SHS’s new annual quota
at 671 immigrants.
The government built specialized institutions in order to establish control over
both emigration and repatriation. The ﬁrst such institution was established in
Zagreb. Known as the emigration oﬃce at the Department for Social Welfare of
the Provincial Government of Croatia and Slavonia, this oﬃce was a relic from
Habsburg times because the Provincial Government of the Kingdom of Croatia,
Slavonia and Dalmatia had already established an emigration oﬃce in 1909.25 The
revived emigration oﬃce in Zagreb maintained a hostel for emigrants and repatri-
ates. It also passed along information about immigration restrictions to the pro-
vincial authorities, which were responsible for issuing passports. In May 1920, the
Ministry for Social Policy in Belgrade, which was responsible for regulating emi-
gration, established its own emigration department. The department’s areas of
competence included the regulation of emigration, the organization of repatriation,
the circulation of ‘national propaganda’ amongst returnees, the settlement of legal
issues between returnees and their relatives, and the posting of emigration deputies
to countries of immigration.26
Eventually, after several changes, the ministry in Belgrade took charge of the
main responsibilities involved in regulating emigration, including the issuing of
emigration passports.27 Most of the practical work, though, was carried out in
Zagreb, where the emigration oﬃce was renamed the General Commissariat for
Emigration in November 1922. The Commissariat was responsible for the gather-
ing of statistical data and was to report annually to the parliament in Belgrade. It
published the brochures Iseljenicˇki vijesti (Emigration News) and Iseljenicˇki propisi
(Emigration Regulations), which informed the public about emigration rules,
opportunities to emigrate, immigration legislation and various practical matters.
All of these institutions operated in the legal framework established by the Law
on Emigration, which was passed by parliament on 30 December 1921.28 When
drafting the bill, Yugoslav policymakers had looked particularly closely at the
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Italian emigration law of 1919. The Law on Emigration was mainly intended to
bring the whole process of emigration – all the way from preparations for departure
to arrival in the country of destination – under state control. According to article 7
of the law, emigrants were deﬁned as ‘manual’ labourers who re-settled overseas
(including Asia and Africa) as were any family members who accompanied them.29
Hence, emigrants to European countries were not oﬃcially considered emigrants
and did not ﬁgure in the emigration statistics until 1927 (Appendix, Figure 1). The
Law on Emigration declared emigration ‘free’, with certain exceptions. The law
prohibited pro-emigration agitation and it imposed strict regulations on the trans-
portation of emigrants. All companies interested in transporting migrants from
Yugoslavia had to acquire a licence from the government, for which they paid a
fee. These fees and ﬁnancial penalties received from steamship companies that
violated the law would go into the ‘Emigration Fund’ (iseljenicˇki fond).
Emigrants had to pay an emigration fee as well, which also went into the
Emigration Fund. The Fund supported emigrants in despair who wanted to
return, ﬁnanced a home for destitute emigrants in Yugoslavia, and paid the salaries
of the emigration authority’s personnel.
One intention of the Yugoslav law, akin to the Italian one, was to ‘nationalize’
emigration and to make it economically beneﬁcial for the state.30 Emigrants were
forced to leave from a domestic port, for example. This provision, however, proved
not to be viable because the Kingdom lacked the necessary port infrastructure. The
city of Rijeka with its deep-sea navigation port was occupied by armed Italian
nationalists in September 1919 and became Italian territory in 1924. All of the
Kingdom’s Adriatic ports were either not equipped for vessels capable of deep-
sea navigation or lacked railway connections with the interior. The only exception
was Susˇak, a port at the edge of Rijeka, where Yugoslav control was established in
February 1924. To solve this dilemma, the requirement that migrants embark and
disembark at a domestic port was suspended.31 Consequently, most Yugoslav emi-
grants left from North Sea ports or from Genoa in the 1920s and 1930s.
The Law on Emigration also called for propaganda activities targeted at
Yugoslav emigrants. In places with signiﬁcant ‘Yugoslav’ e´migre´ communities,
migrant organizations were to be established. Liaison secretaries would link
these organizations with the Yugoslav diplomatic services. Special envoys sent by
the emigration department of the Ministry for Social Policy would also work with
the emigrants. In the 1920s, the number of emigration deputies at ports, major
railway stations and Yugoslav consulates abroad was increased. Eventually, depu-
ties were stationed in the USA, Canada, Argentina, Australia and New Zealand.
The total staﬀ of the Yugoslav emigration service at the end of the 1920s stood at
some 100 oﬃcials.32
Debates in the late 1920s about a new law on Emigration, including the
Emigration Conference in the town of Split in August 1929, did not result in any
changes.33 The king’s coup d’e´tat in January 1929, the subsequent reorganization
of the country’s political landscape, and the economic and political impact of the
global depression on Yugoslavia caused emigration to give way to other, more
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pressing problems. The legal and institutional framework of Yugoslav emigration
policies thus remained in place until 1939, when the autonomous province of
Croatia was established. A change came at this time because Croatia was respon-
sible for its own social policy, including emigration policy, and was entitled to its
own emigration service.34
The ‘Tenth’ Banovina: Creating a Yugoslav Diaspora
Yugoslavia’s emigration policies had two major motives. First, they were to pro-
vide protection for emigrants. Second, they were to render emigration useful for the
creation of the Yugoslav nation. The latter rationale targeted both those who had
already emigrated, and those still in the country. These (potential) emigrants were
subjected to diﬀerent emigration policies depending on whether or not they were
considered ‘national’ elements.
One aim of the Yugoslavian policymakers was to turn South Slav emigrants
abroad into a ‘Yugoslav’ diaspora. This exercise in long-distance nation-building
was supposed to cause South Slavs abroad to identify themselves as Yugoslavs and
to feel attachment to the Kingdom. A 1932 newspaper article illustrated this way of
thinking:
According to the new administrative division [as of October 1929] there are nine
Banovina [provinces] in Yugoslavia, but there is another area that we call the tenth
Banovina, which is our colony in America. They count about one million people.35
The proliﬁc emigration activist Milotislav Bartulica demanded that Yugoslavs
‘consider the emigrants as part of the living people and its state . . .The emigrants
are part of our life’. According to him, emigration policy had to contribute to the
strengthening of the ‘whole body of the people’ including those living far away.
Because he believed that emigrants, by their ‘moral solidarity and economic inter-
ests belong to the mother land’, Bartulica argued against their becoming
‘entrenched in another state or national organism’.36 Similar thoughts had already
been expressed in 1923 by migration expert Benko Grado in a report for the
government:
Only recently had we become aware that besides the Yugoslavia here, there is another,
though smaller one across the sea; that there are hundreds of thousands of people
living there; that Pittsburgh is the fourth largest Yugoslav city in the world according
to population.37
The Yugoslav state called upon ‘its’ emigrants and their oﬀspring to maintain
loyalty to the Kingdom, to further its interests abroad, and not to assimilate into
the culture of their destination country. The government also hoped that by
strengthening the emigrants’ attachment to the new country, it could convince
them to continue sending money home. This was particularly important because
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remittances comprised a large part of Yugoslav foreign currency earnings. In 1928,
for example, the migrant savings inﬂow was estimated at one billion Dinars, which
equalled 15 per cent of the total value of all exports of the Kingdom of SHS.38
Contemporaneous observers noted that emigrants’ money played a crucial role in
stabilizing the Dinar and ﬁnancing the country’s current account.39 Yugoslav
experts estimated that from 1918 to 1930, emigrants sent between 13 and 20 million
US dollars to the country every year. After 1931 the amount they sent receded due
to the eﬀects of the depression on migrant workers’ saving capacities. This trend
left Yugoslav experts scrambling to ﬁnd ways to raise the inﬂow of remittances.40
Imagining emigrants as a constituent part of the nation was by no means a
unique trait of the Kingdom of SHS. Prior to 1918, for example, Polish nationalists
had imagined the Polonia in America as the ‘fourth’ district of their partitioned
nation. The governments of interwar Poland sought to establish cordial relations
between the Polish state and its emigrants.41 Italian nationalists also considered the
italiani all’estero to be an integral part of the nation. The Italian state tried to retain
the loyalty of overseas emigrants, as well. Migrants who returned to Italy could
easily regain their Italian citizenship, if they had become citizens of another coun-
try. Their children were considered Italian citizens even if they were born abroad.42
Yet, who were the ‘Yugoslav’ emigrants that the Kingdom called upon to form a
diaspora? The overwhelming majority of them had left Habsburg territories before
the Kingdom of SHS was created. The emigrants that the state addressed had never
been exposed to consistent Yugoslav nation-building. If they had possessed any
sense of national identity when they left, they had most likely identiﬁed themselves
as members of the Slovenian, Croatian or Serbian nation. Many of them would
have also used a regional identity, describing themselves as ‘Dalmatians’ or
‘Herzegovinians’ for example, or a confessional identity. Yugoslav diaspora poli-
cies, in other words, had the ambitious goal of creating ‘Yugoslavs’ across the
globe. A Ministry for Domestic Aﬀairs policy paper deplored the fact that many
emigrants did not yet know Yugoslavia, and so they still saw themselves as
‘Austrians and Hungarians’.43 Yugoslav diplomats, therefore, worked to instil a
Yugoslav consciousness in South Slavic emigrants from territories now belonging
to the Kingdom of SHS. By caring for the welfare of emigrants and providing
ﬁnancial support for emigrant organizations and periodicals, the government
hoped to engender feelings of attachment to the new state.
The challenge was formidable. The most active emigrants were usually orga-
nized in e´migre´ organizations based on confessional, ethnic or regional aﬃliations.
A 1921 article in the Zagreb-based journal Nova Evropa deplored the ‘division of
[the emigrant organizations] into twenty or more according to tribe; that way they
are much weaker and of less use’.44 According to their names, at least, only a
minority of emigrants’ organizations were ‘Yugoslav’ in orientation. The
Yugoslav government hoped that it could revive the emigrants’ spirit of war-
time unity, when many a South Slavic emigrant from Austria-Hungary had sup-
ported the creation of an independent Yugoslav state, which had been evident in
the activities of the Yugoslav Committee in London, the Yugoslav Council in
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Washington and the Yugoslav Peoples’ Defence in South America.45 With the
establishment of a Yugoslav state, however, the pro-Yugoslav impulse seemed to
have evaporated. The Consul of the Kingdom of SHS to Chicago stressed the
particularism of the emigrants in the United States in a report in 1925:
Our people live mainly in colonies from the same village, district or region, and ﬁnally
according to tribe (pleme). Their associations are organized accordingly as well . . . In
places where they live mixed there is a competition between regional particularisms
about prevalence and leadership: Lic´ani, Hercegovci, Vojvod-ani, Crnogorci among the
Serbs; Dalmatinci and island people, Banovci, Slavonci among the Croats; Kranjci,
Korusˇani and Sˇtajerci among the Slovenes. The sentiments of local and regional pat-
riotism are strongly developed so that in one and the same place, there are often two
or three branches of the same fraternal union . . .Finally, they are organized in tribes:
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes; the tribal particularities and intolerance are usually strong
and verge on chauvinism and hostility. Aside from the tribal diﬀerentiation, the
people are also religiously divided: there are Muslim, Catholic and Orthodox
organizations.46
A Yugoslav count of emigrant organizations in the USA in 1931 listed 15 major
associations, only two of which used the word ‘Yugoslav’ in their names. The
others called themselves Slovenian, Croat, Serb or Catholic. By far the largest
associations were the ‘Croatian Fraternal Union’ (Hrvatska Bratska Zajednica),
the ‘Slovenian National Support Union’ (Slovenska Narodna Podporna Jednota)
and the ‘Krain-Slovenian Catholic Union’ (Kransko-Slovenska Katolisˇka Jednota),
which claimed 92,000, 63,000 and 34,000 members respectively.47 The ‘Yugoslav’
diaspora, thus, seems to have existed only in the minds of the Yugoslav policy-
makers who imagined it. The emigrants who supposedly comprised it were unlikely
to self identify as Yugoslav. The prominent writer Milan Marjanovic´ denounced
this state of aﬀairs during a radio address in December 1937. Marjanovic´, who
during World War One had lobbied for the uniﬁcation of Yugoslavia among
e´migre´s in North and South America, took umbrage at the ‘tribal, regional, reli-
gious and party complacency and exclusiveness’ of Yugoslavs within the country
and abroad.48
To make matters worse, the emigrants were also politically divided. In the eyes
of the government, socialist and communist emigrant groups as well as ‘separatists’
were particularly suspicious. The second joint-ministry conference on emigration,
held on 6 December 1930 in Belgrade, was therefore devoted to the ‘political orien-
tation of the emigrants’. Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs and Ministry of Domestic
Aﬀairs representatives highlighted the ‘anti-state’ propaganda carried out by com-
munist emigrants in the USA, by Macedonian emigrants who had joined pro-
Bulgarian organizations in North America, and by Croat separatists in South
America. The conference concluded by recommending that joint actions be taken
by the responsible ministries in order to crush ‘hostile actions among our emigrants
abroad’ and to provide the emigrant communities with proper cultural activities in
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order to strengthen their identiﬁcation with Yugoslavia.49 The Yugoslav state’s fear
of communists and separatists among the emigrants was also evident in police
investigations of returnees. Especially after the assassination of King Aleksandar
in 1934, repatriates from the Americas were systematically interviewed by the
police in order to check their political aﬃliations and to gain intelligence on
anti-regime e´migre´ groups. In some cases, the police continued to monitor the
movements and correspondence of returnees.50
The authorities, then, tried to keep an eye on emigrants’ political orientation.
The diplomatic service, the emigration deputies and the Central Press Bureau at the
President of the Ministerial Council collected information on emigrant organiza-
tions and their periodicals.51 Several e´migre´ newspapers were outlawed in
Yugoslavia because they were said to be ‘writing against the interests of our
state’.52 The royal dictatorship (1929–1934) prohibited the import of any Croat
e´migre´ periodical with the exception of two Yugoslav oriented ones.53 Embassies
gave occasional ﬁnancial support to patriotic, that is, pro-Yugoslav, organizations
and newspapers.54 In the 1930s, the Emigration Commissariat in Zagreb also
included a Department for National Propaganda Work among the Emigrants,
which aimed at ‘maintaining the national consciousness of our emigrants in the
wider world and strengthening their forces of resistance in the struggle against
assimilation’.55 Another means of inﬂuencing the emigrants were radio broadcasts
from Yugoslavia, which began in the late 1930s.56
The subtitle of the journal The Emigrants’ World (Iseljenicˇki svet, established in
1938) provides an apt description of the rationale of these media eﬀorts: ‘Journal
for National and Cultural Propaganda among the Yugoslav Emigration’. In peri-
odicals such as this, emigrants learnt about the progress of Yugoslavia, the beauty
of its landscapes, the fate of the ruling Karadjordjevic´ dynasty, and the country’s
foreign policy successes. News briefs informed the emigrants about various events
all over the country, such as the opening of a high school in a Bosnian provincial
town, the erection of a monument to King Aleksandar I, the development of
tourism in Montenegro, or the opening of new factories close to Belgrade.
Articles also highlighted the emotional attachment of emigrants to Yugoslavia,
which was manifest for example in their visits to the country. Emigrants ‘from
all ﬁve continents’, the ﬁrst issue of Iseljenicˇki svet reported in 1938, came to the
national pilgrimage site of Oplenac, where a Church and the Karadjordjevic´ mau-
soleum commemorated the country’s liberation. ‘Thousands of Yugoslav emi-
grants water the grave of the King-Uniﬁer’, the journal reported.57 These
newspaper articles and also the radio broadcasts for emigrants in the 1930s dis-
played the ideology of integral Yugoslavism and were also characterized by an
increasing professionalism.
The propaganda addressed not only emigrants but also the domestic audience.
Emigration experts and e´migre´ associations throughout the Kingdom informed the
domestic public about the lives of emigrants. Emigrant organizations lobbied for
greater support for the needs of emigrants and returnees, and developed recom-
mendations on how emigration could be made beneﬁcial for the economy. The ﬁrst
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such association, the Yugoslav Emigration Association (Jugoslavensko iseljenicˇko
udruzˇenje) was established in the town of Split in 1923. Similar organizations
emerged later in Zagreb and other towns. In 1928 these groups founded an
umbrella organization known as the ‘Union of the Organizations of the
Emigrants’ (Savez organizacija iseljenika) in Zagreb. By 1937, this Union had
grown to include 32 domestic and 22 foreign member organizations. Its major
goal was the ‘representation and defence of our emigrants at home and
abroad’.58 The Union published the monthly journal The New Emigrant (Novi
Iseljenik) and the magazine Emigrant Museum (Iseljenicˇki Muzej), which reported
on the emigrant museum that had been established in Zagreb in April 1936. The
museum collected more than 120,000 items related to ‘Yugoslav’ emigration.
Zagreb schools organized visits to the museum so that students would get to
know their fellow-Yugoslavians abroad.59 These eﬀorts aimed at ﬁrmly establish-
ing emigrants as part of the nation in the domestic consciousness. An important
element of this project was its rendering of the nation into an imagined global
community of fate. This task was undertaken in part by apprising Yugoslavs at
home of emigrants’ lot. The New Emigrant, for example, reported extensively on
the anti-immigrant riots in Australia in January 1934, when hundreds of Yugoslav
(and other European) emigrants were injured by an Australian mob.60 The gov-
ernment of Yugoslavia sent ﬁnancial help to these endangered emigrants in the
land down under.
Homogenizing the National ‘Body’
The state’s attempts to control emigration and create a diaspora were the publicly
stated goals of emigration policies.61 Yet there was a hidden agenda as well.
Successive governments aimed at exploiting emigration in order to ethnically hom-
ogenize Yugoslavia’s population by facilitating permanent emigration of non-Slavs
and impeding the emigration of members of the ‘tri-unite’ nation. The principles of
this policy were outlined by the director of the Emigration Commissariat in
Zagreb, Fedor Aranicki. In a 1926 report to the Minister for Social Policy,
Aranicki stressed that in recent years almost half of the emigrants leaving the
Kingdom had been ‘a-national’ elements.62 He continued his report by noting
that: ‘One of the tasks of our emigration policy is to exert inﬂuence over the emi-
gration of the a-national minorities in the future as well, in order to return the
aﬀected regions to their original national character’.
Aranicki pointed out that if this policy was to be successful, the return of
‘a-national’ elements had to be prevented. This idea’s inﬂuence on policy was evident
in the way that emigration passports for the United States were distributed among
the country’s districts. In Slovenia, for example, the small district of Kocˇevje, where
the territory’s German minority was concentrated, received 250 emigration pass-
ports for the USA in 1923/24. The city of Ljubljana, by contrast, was allocated only
10. Districts in the Vojvodina with large Hungarian and German minorities such as
Sombor (291 passports) and Veliki Becˇkerek (490 passports) were allocated many
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more passports than the main city of the region, Novi Sad (40 passports).63
Policymakers justiﬁed this distribution scheme as part of their eﬀort to ensure that
there were not ‘any obstacles’ to the emigration of members of ‘alien’ groups.64 The
requirement that emigrants had to apply for a special emigration passport, which
could only be issued by the Ministry for Social Policy, also served the goal of estab-
lishing central government control over who could leave. Regular international
passports were issued by local authorities.65
Internal rules were explicit about the ethnically diﬀerentiated emigration policy.
In 1924 the Minister for Social Policy informed the departments of his ministry that
the emigration of ‘a-national’ families should be furthered, while ‘national’ families
should be denied permission to emigrate, with the exception of re-migrants.
‘National’ elements were not to be granted emigration to Brazil on an individual
basis, either. This regulation was due to the appalling economic and hygienic con-
ditions endured by Yugoslav immigrants there.66 On 24 March 1925, the Ministry
for Social Policy sent a circular to the Department for State Security at the
Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and to other authorities. Entitled, ‘With Respect to
the Emigration of National Minorities’, declaring that:
In regard to the emigration of national minorities the Ministry shares the view that
their emigration must be favoured. The relevant authorities have agreed and they
maintain their interest in this issue; from that it follows that this was the line of the
practised emigration policies.67
The policy encountered diﬃculties in practice, however. In 1925, the Ministry
had to concede that some local authorities had ‘recently’ departed from it and
impeded the emigration of national minorities. The captain of the district of
Bitola in the south of the country, for example, had stopped issuing passports to
local Slavs because they would use the passports to travel to Bulgaria, where they
received Bulgarian passports that allowed them to emigrate to North America. The
emigration of Slavs from Macedonia was particularly tricky for the Yugoslav state.
Many of them joined pro-Bulgarian, anti-Yugoslav nationalist organizations in
America or Australia. These organizations agitated for the separation of the
Serb-controlled part of Macedonia from Yugoslavia and its accession to
Bulgaria. Successive Bulgarian governments supported these pro-Bulgarian activ-
ities in America and in Serb controlled Macedonia. The Yugoslav General Consul
in Chicago reported in 1925 that many of the immigrants fromMacedonia (or as he
called it, ‘Southern Serbia’) were successfully recruited by the pro-Bulgarian
Macedonian Political Organization in the United States and became lost for ‘our
propaganda’. He explained this process of recruitment in economic and social
terms:
[They] are forced to ﬁnd jobs over here with the help of their compatriots who had
settled earlier and thus maintain the bonds to the Bugarasˇi [pro-Bulgarian
Macedonians]. They enter actively into their organizations. This is made even easier
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by the fact that the Serbian colony over here has completely diﬀerent customs and a
diﬀerent mentality than our Macedonians.68
To remedy this situation, the General Consul suggested stopping the emigration
of Macedonians. The Ministry for Social Policy responded by reiterating its pref-
erence for facilitating minority emigration and in so doing it implicitly acknowl-
edged the existence of a Bulgarian minority in Macedonia, which the government
denied in oﬃcial statements. The Ministry wrote that it was well known that mem-
bers of the Bulgarian and Hungarian minorities supported irredentist causes. Thus,
the Ministry preferred that they leave for good. However, the Ministry was aware
that many emigrants would continue their anti-state propaganda abroad and,
therefore, requested opinions from other Ministries concerning the question,
‘whether these elements are more dangerous within the borders of the state or
abroad, i.e. whether their emigration should be favoured or obstructed’.69
This episode shows that the implementation of a policy to further minority
emigration was more diﬃcult than initially thought. Furthermore, the government
became aware that due to its repressive minority policies and its support for minor-
ity emigration, it unwillingly contributed to the creation of a disloyal anti-diaspora.
These e´migre´s from Yugoslavia continued to ﬁght for their home regions’ separ-
ation from Yugoslavia long after they had left the country. The case of the
Macedonians was especially worrisome for the government, because the Slavic
inhabitants of Macedonia were oﬃcially considered Serbs. Yet, even authorities
on the ground were forced to recognize that their ‘Serbianization’ policies were
failing. This became particularly evident when Slavs who had emigrated from
Macedonia articulated pro-Bulgarian sentiments. Oﬃcials reasoned that such rhet-
oric could at least be suppressed by the police if Bulgarian Slavs were kept in the
Kingdom of SHS.
The government’s attempt to impede the emigration of ‘national elements’ was
also challenged by local forces. In 1924, for example, the district captain of
Dubrovnik responded to the Ministry for Social Policy’s instructions that no
‘national families and individuals’ were to be allowed to emigrate to Brazil. In
his response, the captain informed the Ministry that he had been approached by
the local authorities of the town of Blato on the Adriatic island of Korcˇula, because
70 families wanted to leave Blato for Brazil. The economic conditions on the island
were so bad that people felt that they had no choice but to emigrate. People from
the island had emigrated in the past in order to escape the bad conditions there.
Furthermore, emigration to Brazil was cheap because the Brazilian government
paid for the migrant’s transportation.70 The district captain requested instructions
from the Ministry on how to proceed. The Ministry’s response to this speciﬁc case
is not known, but in general the Ministry for Social Policy maintained its policy of
barring ‘national elements’ from emigrating to Brazil while favouring ‘a-nationals’
who wanted to do so.71
During the Great Depression the most notable Yugoslav emigration expert,
Artur Benko Grado, questioned the wisdom of this policy. In a policy paper on
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the ‘Emigration of Our National Elements, Especially from Rural Joint Families’
he argued that the preference given to the emigration of minorities ought to be
reversed.72 Grado argued that many members of large family households (zadruga)
in the countryside would return after some years of working abroad because part of
their family remained in Yugoslavia. These repatriates would come back with
savings and new knowledge that would beneﬁt their families. Grado also stressed
the fact that many rural families owned so little land that all of their able-bodied
members could not be meaningfully employed on the family farm. It would, there-
fore, be far better if these additional family members took a job abroad for a
couple of years, sending money home and eventually returning with savings.
Grado questioned the assumption that emigration would lead to destitution. He
claimed that regions with minority populations, such as the Vojvodina, were cur-
rently ﬂourishing due to remittances sent home by former residents, whose emi-
gration the state had supported. Grado, therefore, suggested revising the policy of
deterring ‘national’ elements from emigration and supporting ‘a-national’ ones
because this policy had adverse economic eﬀects for Yugoslavia.
The policy of facilitating minority emigration was not carried out with the same
gusto for all minority groups. Oﬃcial pressure to leave and the state of a minority
group’s rights were correlated to the extent that that minority was considered
hostile to the government. The large German minority fared the best in this
regard because it was not seen as a threat. Principally, this was because
Germany did not harbour claims on Yugoslav territory. Additionally, after 1933
Yugoslavia became increasingly dependent on trade with Nazi Germany. Still,
Germans were actually overrepresented among Yugoslavia’s overseas migrants.
The overall rate of overseas emigration was so low, however, that it did not sig-
niﬁcantly change the country’s demographics. With the exception of the years
immediately following World War One, emigration of Germans to Germany and
Austria was also insigniﬁcant. The Yugoslav emigration expert Benko Grado even
reasoned that because the Germans were hard-working and easy to govern, they
should not be pushed to leave.73 In comparison with the Germans, the Hungarian
minority’s rights were violated much more frequently. The fact that the Hungarian
minority was concentrated near the Hungarian border, and that Hungary pursued
revisionist claims towards Yugoslavia, made the group a threat in the eyes of the
Belgrade government. Nevertheless, there is no indication that a coherent policy
forced Hungarians to leave. The bulk of Hungarian emigrants from Yugoslavia left
immediately after World War One. In total it is estimated that some 45,000
Hungarians emigrated from Yugoslavia between 1918 and 1924.74
The non-Slavic Muslim minorities (ethnic Turks and Albanians) faced much
greater pressure to emigrate because the dominant Serb political elite considered
them a particularly problematic group. Edvin Pezo estimates that between 1919
and 1941 some 64,000 to 78,000 Muslims left ‘Southern Serbia’ for Turkey.75 These
Muslim minorities did not ﬁt the notion of a South Slavic Kulturnation (cultural
nation) and no leading politician believed that they would ever be assimilated (the
Serbo-Croatian speaking Bosnian Muslims, on the other hand, were considered to
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be part of the Yugoslav nation). Many Serbs considered Albanians and Turks to be
modern-day embodiments of the former Ottoman ‘oppressor’. Perhaps more
importantly, Albanians and Turks populated so-called Southern Serbia (Kosovo
and Macedonia), the region that Serb politicians considered the spiritual heart of
Serbia. Administrative and legal measures undertaken by the Yugoslav government
facilitated their emigration. These migrants were, for example, exempted from the
obligatory fee that an emigrant usually had to pay in order to leave Yugoslavia.76
The Law on Citizenship, which came into eﬀect on 1 November 1928, included a
clause that allowed non-Slavs who had been citizens of the Ottoman Empire until
1913 to opt out of Yugoslav citizenship. Anyone who made use of this option,
however, had to leave the country within a year.77 Non-Slavic Muslims were not
granted the right to repatriate to Yugoslavia even if they held Yugoslav citizenship.
Parallel to its support for the emigration of Albanians and Turks from Southern
Serbia, the government also encouraged Serb families to colonize the region. These
migrants came mainly from Bosnia, Montenegro and the Karst Regions of Croatia.
They were sent to Kosovo and Macedonia in order to re-shape the ethno-demo-
graphic situation there (Slavic families were also resettled to the Vojvodina).
Because colonists received land, tax credits and other beneﬁts from the govern-
ment, it was thought that they would put additional pressure on the local Muslim
population and thus make emigration seem even more desirable to Muslims. Some
13,000 families, most of whom were Serbs, were settled in Kosovo alone.78
Although the government usually framed this policy in terms of strengthening
the ‘Yugoslav’ nation, its subtext was clear. The aim was to Serbianize Kosovo
and Macedonia. It was also not by chance that many local administrators in these
regions were drawn from ardently nationalist Serbian circles. The authorities also
hoped that the opportunity to get land and government subsidies within
Yugoslavia would prevent ‘national’ peasant families from emigrating. Djordje
Kristic´, who was responsible for conducting agrarian reform and colonization in
Macedonia, wrote that: ‘The problem of Southern Serbia is connected with the
emigration question. All of our national elements, who would be forced to leave the
country, will ﬁnd a place in Southern Serbia’.79 Even some emigrants from America
returned to Yugoslavia in order to settle in Kosovo – though many of them later
returned to America because of the terrible conditions they found there.80
In the 1930s increasing international tensions led to growing fears among the
political elite in Belgrade about the loyalty of minority populations. The govern-
ments of Prime Minister Milan Stojadinovic´ (1935–1939) in particular, which pro-
pagated integral Yugoslavism, aimed at resettling Albanians and Turks outside of
Yugoslavia. An Inter-Ministerial Conference, constituted by the Ministries of
Foreign Aﬀairs, of Domestic Aﬀairs, of Agriculture and the General Command
of the Army, came up with a radical plan on the ‘Question of the Emigration of the
Non-Slavic Population from Southern Serbia’ in the autumn of 1935.81 The
Conference recommended that the government sign a bilateral resettlement
treaty with the Republic of Turkey. In case this proved impossible, the memoran-
dum detailed a range of measures intended to put so much pressure on Turks and
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Albanians that they would leave ‘voluntarily’, without provoking the League of
Nations to intervene. Among these were the rigorous enforcement of all laws and
regulations, especially with regard to taxation, the suppression of Albanian anti-
emigration propaganda, the mobilization of non-Slavic males in Southern Serbia
for army training and manoeuvres as often as possible, the preclusion of non-Slavs
from holding government jobs, the strict enforcement of obligatory schooling in
‘our schools’ and ﬁnally the rapid ‘nationalization’ of toponyms and personal
names.
Local authorities’ implementation of these measures in Southern Serbia often
turned violent. Nevertheless, only a few thousand Muslims appear to have left in
the 1930s, in part because Turkey was reluctant to accept Albanians. Only Turkish-
speaking Muslims or those who adhered to ‘Turkish’ cultural practices were wel-
comed by Ankara.82 In July 1938, the governments of Yugoslavia and Turkey
eventually signed a Convention regulating the resettlement of 40,000 ‘Turkish’
families. Due to the outbreak of World War Two, however, it was never imple-
mented. More radical ideas, such as the forced expulsion of Albanians, which was
demanded by the well known University of Belgrade Professor Vaso C´ubrilovic´ in
a 1937 lecture, were not carried out either.
Results
Yugoslav emigration policies did impact upon emigration but not to the extent that
the government hoped they would. Take, for example, the government’s attempt to
create a Yugoslav diaspora. As reports detailing divisions among emigrant groups
revealed, only some of the emigrants of ‘Yugoslav’ extraction actually identiﬁed
with the Yugoslav nation. Yugoslav policymakers repeatedly deplored the fact that
emigrants in America became increasingly assimilated and their organizations
declined because there were so few new arrivals from Yugoslavia.83 The few
links that the emigrants did maintain with the old country mainly connected
them to their families and their native communities. Rarely did these links connect
them to the abstract collective of the Yugoslav nation.
Yet mid-1930s consular reports from South America provide some evidence of
the strengthening of ‘Yugoslav’ consciousness among some emigrants there. This
was attributed to the increased concern of the Yugoslav government for these
emigrants.84 Furthermore, during World War Two, when the fate of the family
in the ‘old country’ became linked to the nation in a very existential manner,
emigrants did rally for Yugoslavia. During the War, emigrants organized support
for occupied Yugoslavia and lobbied for the country’s liberation regardless of
whether they considered themselves Yugoslavs or identiﬁed with one of the
state’s constituent nations.85 A contingent, dramatic event thus impacted emi-
grants’ loyalties and reconﬁgured them into a temporary diaspora.
The authorities’ nationally diﬀerentiated attitude towards emigration did result
in disproportionate minority emigration. Between 1921 and 1933 (the last year with
an ethnic breakdown of emigrants), 17.5 per cent (29,887 persons) of all registered
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emigrants (170,969) belonged to the German minority, and 8.9 per cent (15,293
persons) to the Hungarian minority (Appendix, Table 2). This was far beyond their
share of the country’s total population, which was about 4 per cent in each case
(Appendix, Table 1). Nevertheless, the vast majority of emigrants were classiﬁed as
‘Yugoslavs’, so the prevention of emigration by ‘national’ elements was a failure.
There was also no signiﬁcant emigration to Austria, Germany and Hungary – with
the exception of the ﬁrst years after World War One – a trend that indicates that
few ethnic Germans and Hungarians left for their supposed ‘homelands’. The pro-
hibition against the repatriation of ‘a-national’ emigrants was not enforced, either
(see Appendix, Table 3). The share of Germans amongst all repatriates from over-
seas was more than twice their share in the total population. Hungarians were also
allowed to return. Muslim Albanians and Turks did leave in signiﬁcant numbers
but far fewer members of these groups left than Serb politicians had initially hoped.
In general, emigration numbers from Yugoslavia were too small in the interwar
period to have a signiﬁcant impact on the population’s ethnic distribution.
The only ‘success’ of Yugoslavia’s nationalistically motivated migration policies
was the noticeable increase of the Serbian population in Kosovo, from 21.1 per
cent of the region’s total population in 1921 to 31.1 per cent in 1931, which was due
to state-sponsored colonization.86
The government in Belgrade often failed to ensure the execution of the
policies it intended to implement. District authorities, for example, ignored
instructions from the central government if they considered emigration to be
an economic beneﬁt. Corruption added further arbitrariness to the administra-
tion of emigration. Archival documents and newspaper reports reveal that the
payment of bribes signiﬁcantly smoothed the issuing of emigration passports.
A secretary in the Ministry for Social Policy’s emigration department informed
the minister in August 1923 that ‘the whole country knows’ that passports for
emigration are issued by the department only after the payment of bribes.87 In
Belgrade, an agency known as ‘Mediator’ oﬀered passport applicants help with
the authorities – for a fee, of course.88 Irregularities and corruption were also
reported from consulates.89
Conclusion
The Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s experiences regulating migration were similar to
those of many other states. Much like their counterparts elsewhere, Yugoslav pol-
icymakers found that neither emigration nor immigration could be totally be con-
trolled by the state. Nevertheless, the example of interwar Yugoslavia oﬀers
important lessons about the place of emigration in times of intense nation- and
state-building. Emigration can be as politicized as immigration and it can be used
as a means towards nationalism. Yugoslav emigration policies highlight the dom-
inant notions about the nature of the nation amongst political and bureaucratic
elites. These elite actors envisioned the state as the ‘tri-unite nation’ comprised of
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the Serb, Croat and Slovenian ‘tribes’. Adherence to this notion resulted in policies
that included speciﬁc groups in the nation and excluded others from it. Policies of
exit and entry are excellent examples of this.
Imagining the nation as an ethnic community resulted in a de-territorialized
vision of the nation that allowed for its members to be dispersed across the
globe. Interwar Yugoslav politicians and bureaucrats considered the nation’s dis-
location to be a potential resource for their state and thus embarked on a policy of
diaspora-building. They engaged in transnational policies for the sake of nation-
building. Membership in the transterritorial nation required the performance of
duties for the ‘motherland’, such as remitting money and lobbying for the ‘old
home’ but it also came with rights, such as the promise of protection by the gov-
ernment.90 Attempts to exploit emigration as a means towards state development
also show how interwar Yugoslavia’s political system was essentially modernist.
This was a state that aimed at establishing its authority over the most basic pro-
cesses of social reproduction, including migration, and at projecting its sovereignty
over all its citizens, no matter where they lived.
Finally, this case is instructive due to the longer historical continuities of
which it is part. Already before World War One, the provincial government of
the Kingdom of Croatia and Slavonia had considered ways to turn the South
Slavic emigrants from its territory into a loyal diaspora. Later, the fascist
Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzˇava Hrvatska, 1941–45) had similar
designs. After World War Two, socialist Yugoslavia also actively engaged in
identity politics towards emigrants. Those emigrants who had left before socialist
Yugoslavia was established were targeted by state propaganda and called upon to
return, so long as they were not considered to be ‘hostile’ elements. Each indi-
vidual republic created an association for its emigrants which informed them
about developments in their former home and aimed at nourishing a feeling of
belonging to Yugoslavia. When more than a million so-called Gastarbeiter (guest
workers) left Yugoslavia in the 1960s and 1970s, the authorities continued to
regard them as an integral part of the Yugoslav working class, addressing
them by speciﬁc identity policies. The post-Yugoslav successor states pursued
similar policies when they called upon their ‘diasporas’ to help them in the strug-
gle for independence and the war eﬀort during the 1990s. Co-ethnic emigrants
were also urged to return to their now independent ‘home country’.91 Emigration
policies, therefore, are a political longue dure´e phenomenon in the area of the
former Yugoslavia. They prove that transnationalism should not be set against
nationalism – transnational links and activities can be a part, or even the result,
of nationalist designs.
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Appendix
Table 2. Overseas emigrants from Yugoslavia, by ethnicity, 1921–1933
Yugoslavs Germans Magyars Total
number in % number in % number in %
in % of total
emigration
1921 9,516 73.40 2,594 20.01 700 5.40 98.80
1922 4,880 80.18 760 12.49 259 4.26 96.93
1923 5,698 60.81 2,322 24.78 1,169 12.48 98.07
1924 8,525 49.45 4,239 24.59 4,218 24.47 98.51
1925 7,824 52.14 3,692 24.61 3,082 20.54 97.29
1926 11,044 70.23 2,671 16.98 1,563 9.94 97.15
1927 13,775 70.62 3,561 18.26 1,667 8.55 97.42
1928 14,939 76.76 3,092 15.89 985 5.06 97.70
1929 10,599 67.38 3,844 24.44 799 5.08 96.90
1930 8,091 70.79 2,308 20.19 632 5.53 96.52
1931 2,639 78.15 465 13.77 134 3.97 95.88
1932 1,342 83.88 193 12.06 31 1.94 97.88
1933 1,207 83.94 146 10.15 54 3.76 97.84
Note: Emigrants with foreign citizenship have been excluded from this calculation.
Source: Statisticˇki godisˇnjak Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1929 (Belgrade 1930), 131; Statisticˇki godisˇnjak Kraljevine
Jugoslavije 1933 (Belgrade 1934), 70–1.
Table 1. The ethnic composition of the Kingdom of SHS in 1918
% of total
Serbs (including Montenegrins) 4,704,876 39.0
Croats 2,889,102 23.9
Slovenes 1,023,588 8.5
Muslim Serbo-Croats 759,656 6.3
Macedonians 630,000 5.3
Germans 512,207 4.3
Albanians 483,871 4.0
Magyars 472,079 3.9
Romanians 183,563 1.6
Turks 143,453 1.2
Italians 11,630 0.1
Other Slavs 198,887 1.6
Others 42,756 0.3
Source: Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, vol. 6 (Zagreb 1990), 263.
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Figure 1. Emigration and returns in the Kingdom of SHS/Yugoslavia, 1918–1939.
Source: Statisticˇki godisˇnjak Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1929 (Belgrade 1932), 122; Statisticˇki godisˇnjak
Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1938/39 (Belgrade 1940), 137–9.
Table 3. Returnees from overseas to Yugoslavia, by ethnicity, 1924–1933
Yugoslavs Germans Magyars Total
number in % number in % number in % in %
1924 2,993 79.28 461 12.21 98 2.60 94.09
1925 4,188 85.12 450 9.15 233 4.74 99.00
1926 3,889 80.38 568 11.74 248 5.13 97.25
1927 3,982 84.62 440 9.35 192 4.08 98.05
1928 2,982 78.56 499 13.15 205 5.40 97.10
1929 3,764 79.46 581 12.27 241 5.09 96.81
1930 4,866 81.44 627 10.49 279 4.67 96.60
1931 6,386 83.75 723 9.48 232 3.04 96.28
1932 4,555 83.75 520 9.56 197 3.62 96.93
1933 2,610 83.23 281 8.96 95 3.03 95.22
Note: Returnees with foreign citizenship have been excluded from this calculation.
Source: Statisticˇki godisˇnjak Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1929 (Belgrade 1930), 131; Statisticˇki godisˇnjak Kraljevine
Jugoslavije 1934 (Belgrade 1935), 70.
Brunnbauer 627
 at Universitatsbibliothek on August 23, 2016ehq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
